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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Monetary policy has been aggressively used by the central Bank of Pakistan, in 
this decade, first to bolster growth and then to contain rampant inflation. Despite the 
sufficiently tight monetary policy that has remained in vogue in recent times, the inflation 
is still around 20 percent. This has raised questions about the effectiveness of monetary 
policy. One possible reason for the lesser effectiveness, if not failure, of monetary policy 
in taming inflation could be that in recent times, inflation was primarily supply driven 
and that the monetary tightening was in part offset by fiscal expansion, on the back of 
heavy bank borrowing by the government. However one cannot rule out the possibility 
that market imperfections might have also impeded the effectiveness of monetary policy 
in taming inflation to the desired extent. Incomplete and slow pass through of changes in 
policy  interest  rate  to  deposit  rate  and  lending  rate  is  a  kind  of  imperfection  that 
constrains the effectiveness of monetary policy. This study examines the pass through of 
policy interest rate to different market rates. 
Monetary theory predicts that the change in policy interest rate influences the cost 
capital which in turn influences consumption, savings, investments, and hence output. 
However if the impact of the change in policy rate on the cost of capital is less than one 
for one or if the change in policy rate fails to influence the cost capital immediately then 
the impact on output would become visible only with a certain lag and the impact would 
be less than one for one. This implies that if for example only 70 percent of the change in 
policy rate is passed on to cost of capital, then to manage an increase of 100 basis points 
in cost capital the policy rate should be raised by 143 basis points. This example serves to 
emphasise that for effective monetary management knowledge of the magnitude of pass-
through of policy rate and the lag structure with which the policy rate influences cost of 
capital  is  important.  Substantive  empirical  evidence  confirms  that  changes  in  policy 
interest rate are transmitted to the output with a certain lag and that the pass-through of 
changes in policy rate to output or to other elements of the transmission channel may be 
less than one for one. Given the policy implications of the information, on the magnitude 
of  pass  through  and  the  lag  structure  with  which  the  policy  rate  influences  different 
market rates, this Paper seeks to measure the pass-through of the changes in six month 
Treasury bill rate to six month KIBOR, six month weighted average deposit rate and 
weighted average lending rate. The study is focused on Pakistan.  
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Our results, obtained using transfer function approach, show that the pass through of 
changes in Treasury bill rate to KIBOR is very quick. Eighty seven percent of the change is 
passed on to KIBOR during one month. However the pass-through to the weighted average 
lending and six month deposit rate is only 43 percent and 16 percent respectively. The 
changes in policy rate are transmitted to the lending rate with a lag of one to one and half year 
while the pass through to six month deposit rate occurs with a lag of one year.  
Our  results  also  show  that  the  pass  through  to  lending  and  deposit  rate  is 
asymmetric, with the pass through for the lending rate being greater than that for the 
deposit rate. One reason for the greater pass-through to lending rate is that some type of 
loans, including corporate loans and loans to the public sector for commodity operations 
are linked to KIBOR since the past few years. The pegging of lending rate to KIBOR 
(quoting the rate as KIBOR plus) implies that if the KIBOR increases by say 100 basis 
point then lending rate would follow suit by similar magnitude. However deposit rates are 
mostly not pegged to any rate. This explains the asymmetric pass-through.  
Moreover it is beneficial for banks to pass on the changes in interest rate to the 
lending when the policy interest rate is on the rise and to the deposit rate when the policy 
rate  is  on  the  decline.  More  episodes  of  increase  in  policy  interest  rate,  in  terms  of 
number as well as magnitude, relative to decrease, explains the greater pass through to 
the lending rate. Lastly little sensitivity of the depositors to interest rate changes has 
enabled the banks to get away with the lower pass through to the lending rate. Finally we 
have  also  shown  that  slow  pass-through  further  dampens  the  possibility  of  applying 
Taylor rule in Pakistan.  
A word of caution is in order here.  Loans and deposits are contracted in such a 
manner that the change in lending and deposit rates mostly applies only to the fresh loans 
and deposits and not the outstanding ones. We have calculated the pass through to the 
outstanding loans and deposits which include the loans and deposits contracted in the past 
at rates prevalent before the change in policy interest rate. This has been done for want of 
long enough time series on rates for fresh lending and deposit mobilisation. This aspect 
serves to emphasise the point that loans and deposits need to be contracted on floating 
terms, that is linked to some rate which changes almost immediately with the change 
treasury bill rate. One such rate is KIBOR. 
Rest  of  the  paper  is  organised  as  follows:  Section  2  is  devoted  to  review  of 
literature on the subject of interest rate pass through. Section 3 is about the methodology 
and describes the data as well. Section 4 presents and interprets the empirical results. 
Section 5 discusses the slow pass through in the context of application of the Taylor rule 
and Section 6 concludes the paper.  
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature on interest rate pass-through has two strands. One that examines just 
the magnitude of pass-through i.e. whether pass-through of changes in policy rate to 
market or deposit and lending rate is complete or incomplete and the determinants of 
pass-through. The second strand of literature, examines the macroeconomic implication 
of incomplete/sluggish pass-through. We discuss all the three strands in this section. 
There is near-consensus in literature on pass through that pass-through in short-
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studies that report less tha complete pass-through include [Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994); 
Hanan and Berger (1991); Mojon (2000) and Bondt (2002)]. Bondt, Mojon, and Valla 
(2005) report, that pass-through in the short-run (monthly) ranges between 0.25 [Sander 
and Kleimeier (2002); Hofmann (2006) to 0.76 Heinemann and Sch¨uler (2002)].   For 
long-run Gropp, Kok Sørensen, and Lichtenberger (2007), report an incomplete pass-
through in euro area, even after controlling for differences in bank soundness, credit risk, 
and  the  slope of  the  yield  curve.  The studies  that  report  a  complete  pass-through  of 
market  rates  to  short-term  interest  rates,  in  the  long-run  include,  Mojon  (2000), 
Heinemann and Sch¨uler (2002), Hofmann (2003), and Sander and Kleimeier (2002). 
However Donnay and Degryse (2001) and Toolsema, Sturm, and de Haan (2001) report 
an incomplete pass-through even in the long-run.  
2.1.  Determinants of Pass-through 
The sources of incomplete pass-through that emerge from review of a number of 
studies include, menu costs involved in altering the contract, Implicit contract between 
banker and customer for protection against rate volatility, competitiveness of the banking 
structure, moral hazards involved in negotiating new loan contracts, capital mobility and 
private ownership of banks. These sources are briefly discussed below.  
The bank would change the rate only when the expected gain from the revision is 
greater than the menu costs involved in altering the rate [e.g. Hannan and Berger (1991); 
Hofmann  and  Mizen  (2004)].  Banks  that  seek  to  earn  by  fostering  a  long  term 
relationship with their customers have an implicit contract with their customers to protect 
them from interest rate volatility. The response of these banks to changes in policy rate is 
likely to be sluggish [Berger and Udell (1992); Allen and Gale (2000)]. Weyth (2002) 
provides empirical evidence that banks that rely on long term stable relationship with 
their customers are slow to adjust their lending rates. Specifically they show that small 
banks that generate funds from deposits (i.e. rely on relationship with customers) are 
slow to adjust their rates while the larger banks that generate funds from the market are 
relatively quick to adjust their rates (of course due the adjustment in the market rate). 
Kwapil  and  Scharler  (2006)  argue  that  given  asymmetric  information,  moral 
hazards may arise if the lending rate increases, i.e. the borrower who borrows at a higher 
rate may undertake risky ventures thereby endangering bank’s money. In this situation 
the bank may prefer to rely on changing other terms, like collateral requirement rather 
than increasing the rate. The pass-through again would remain incomplete. Other sources 
of sluggish pass through that have been identified empirically include competitiveness of 
the  financial  markets  [Gropp,  Sørensen,  and  Lichtenberger  (2007)],  differences  in 
financial structure of the banks [Schwarzbauer (2006), Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994)].  
Cottarelli and Kourelis  argue features of the financial structure that speed up the pass-
through  include  capital  mobility,  private  ownership  of  banks  and  stability  of  money 
market rates. Another reason for slow pass-through put forth by de Bondt, Mojon, and 
Valla (2005) is that at times the short term rates of banks are linked to long term market 
rates. Anticipated changes in monetary policy is another source of slow-pass through 
identified by Sander and Kleimeier (2006).   
Hanan and Berger (1991) find that pass-through to deposit rate is asymmetric for 
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typically the customers respond with a lag to change in prices. If the deposit rates are 
changed today then the full expected response in the shape of more deposits will be 
realised after sometime, say, a month. During this lag period the banks pay more interest 
to depositors without realising the corresponding benefits in the shape of larger deposit 
volume. Similarly when the interest rate on deposits is reduced, even the interest sensitive 
customers, will take time to withdraw their deposits. During this lag-period the bank 
would pay lesser interest without incurring corresponding penalty in the shape of reduced 
deposit volume. Given the foregoing HB argues that increasing interest rate on deposits is 
harmful for banks in while decreasing interest rate is likely to prove fruitful, at least in 
the short run. This makes the pass through asymmetric.  
A problem that arises in empirical estimation of pass-through from policy rate to 
deposit and lending rates is of maturity mismatch. The issue has been raised by Mojon 
(2000) and Bondt (2005). The problem is that the instrument which reflects the policy 
rate policy rate and the money market rate are of short term maturity while the deposit 
and lending rates could be of longer maturity as well. Bondt (2002) avoids the maturity 
mismatch problem by examining money market rates of comparable maturity.   
3.  EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
To  estimate  our  model  we  use  transfer  function  approach  developed  by  Box, 
Jenkins,  and  Reinsel  (1994).  The  transfer  function  model  in  essence  shows  how  a 
movement in the independent variable influences the changes in dependent variable. The 
model  allows  identification  of  the  lag  structure  with  which  the  independent  variable 
influences  the  dependent  variable  and  also  measure  the  magnitude  of  influence.  The 
model is one of the most widely used in linear times series estimation. The methodology 
is explained below. 
Let us assume that an independent variable xt and dependent variable yt are jointly   
stationary. Now yt can be written as: 
t t t N z y                                   
Where zt contains that part of yt which can be explained in term of xt, and Nt is an error or 
noise term which is auto-correlated but is independent of the input series xt. Here, both yt 
and  xt  are  observable,  while  zt  is  not  observable.  Suppose  the  dynamic  relationship 
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Mostly  the  term  Nt  is  non-stationary  and  it  can  be  represented  as 
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In practice, we normally do not know the form of v (B) and the structure of  Nt i.e. 
the parameters r, s, b, p, and q and have to identify them through the analyses of data on 
variables  xt and yt. 
The identification consists of pre-whitening the independent as well as dependent 
variable  on  the  basis  of  ARMA  (p,  q)  of  independent  variable.  Using  correlogram, 
autocorrelation functions, and partial correlation functions of the pre-whitened variables, 
the best fitted model is selected for estimation.
1  
Using the methodology discussed above we have estimated the pass through of the 
six month treasury bill rate to six month KIBOR, Six month deposit rate and weighted 
average lending rate. For the pass through to KIBOR the data span September 2001-
February 2009 and the data frequency is monthly. The reason for the shorter data span is 
that the KIBOR rate was introduced in 2001. For the lending and deposit rates we have 
used the span June 1991—June 2008 and the data frequency is biannual. The reason for 
the choice of frequency in this case is dictated by data availability. Over the recent years 
the State Bank has used discount rate as an instrument of the policy and it would have 
been more appropriate to estimate the pass through from the discount rate rather than the 
treasury bill rate. However following two reasons do not allow the construction of a long 
enough time series of change in discount rate. First, the changes in discount rate have 
been occurring at irregular intervals besides the State bank’s active use of the discount 
the rate as an instrument of monetary policy is not too old.   
4.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
4.1.  Pass Through from TBR to KIBOR Rate  
We estimate the pass through from the 6-month  Treasury bill rate to  6-month 
KIBOR  rate  using  data  with  monthly  frequency.  The  data  span  is  September  2001- 
February  2009.  The  State  Bank  of  Pakistan  is  now  using  discount  rate  as  a  policy 
instrument however since the changes in discount rate occurs only at discreet interval we 
have used 6-month Treasury bill rate as proxy for policy rate.  
The  first  step  under  the  Box  Jenkins,  transfer  function  approach  is  to  fit  an 
ARIMA model to the { TBR} series. We obtain the Autocorrelation Function (ACF), 
Partial  Autocorrelation  Function  (PACF)  and  the  respective  correlograms  for  TBR. 
These are respectively presented below in Tables 1(a and b) and Figures 1(a and b).   
Table 1(a) 
Auto Correlation Function (ACF) of  TBR 
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)  
 
Q-Stat.  0.468  0.474  0.302  0.170  0.144  0.091  0.096  0.055  0.040    
Q-Stat.  0.099  0.142  0.145  0.225  0.176  0.1270  0.063  0.120  0.039   
 
1 For detail see Box and Jenkins (1994). Khawaja and Khan   666
Table 1(b) 
Partial Auto Correlation Function (PACF) of  TBR 












Tables  1(a  and  b),  and  Figures  1(a  and  b)  show  that  ACF  and  PACF  are 
respectively significant up to 3rd and 2nd lag. This suggests ARMA (2, 3) for  TBR. The 
most plausible models for  TBR then is:                                      
TBR =ß1 TBRt - 1 +ß2 TBRt - 2 +ezt       …  …  …  …  (2)  Pass-through of Change in Policy  667
The next step is to obtain pre-whitened series for our dependent variable ( TBR) 
and Independent variable ( KIBOR) 
Filtered (pre-whitened) series for  TBR  is:                         
at =  TBR -  0.32 TBRt - 1-  0.31 TBRt -  2  …  …  …  …  (3) 
Pre-whitened series for  KIBOR is:  
ßt =  KIBOR -  0. 32 KIBOR t - 1-  0.31  KIBORt - 2  …  …  (4) 
Next  we  obtain  cross-correlation  and  cross-correlogram  between  our  two  pre-
whitened series: at and ßt. These are presented below respectively in Table 2 and Figure 2.  
                                                             Table 2 
Cross Correlation between at and ßt  
(0)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
 
0.637  0.327  –0.257  0.048  –0.019  –0.073  0.100  0.020  –0.05  –0.094 
S.Dev.  0.014  0.014  0.014  0.014  0.014  0.014  0.014  0.014  0.014  0.014  
(10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19)  
–0.023  0.012  –0.011  0.037  0.010  –0.055  –0.024  –0.067  0.002  0.094 
S.Dev.  0.014  0.014  0.014  0.014  0.014  0.014  0.014  0.014  0.014  0.014 
 
Fig. 2. 
                                       
 
 
Table 2 and Figure 2 show that  (0),  (1) and  (2) are statistically significant.  
Next based on cross-correlation between pre-whitened series at and ßt, we select the 
following model:     
ßt = a1ßt-1 + b1at +b2at-1 + b3at-2 +et… …….. (4) 
Estimation of (4) yields:      
                 ßt = 0.09ßt-1 +0.83at+0.46at-1-0.22at-2 +et … … (5) 
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The ACF, PACF of the error term et and the relevant correlograms are presented 
below   in Tables 3(a and b) and Figures 3 (a and b) respectively.   
Table 3(a) 
Auto Correlation Function (ACF) of et 
Q-Stat.  –0.022  –0.360  –0.060 –0.120 –0.019  0.200  0.026  –0.014  –0.095  
Q-Stat.  –0.140  0.014  0.113  0.039  0.003  –0.089 –0.113 0.028  0.103 
 
Table 3(b) 
Partial Auto Correlation Function (PACF) of et 
Q-Stat.  –0.022  –0.361  –0.090  –0.297  –0.132  0.019  –0.055  0.051  –0.113        
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On the basis of ACF and PACF of et the preliminary model for et is:  
et = -0.93et-2- 0.39 et-4- 0.32 et-6 +(0.52L
2 + 0.43L
6) et  …  …  (6) 
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(7) 
Then  we  expand  the  first  term  in  Equation  6  using  binomial  expansion.  This 
yields: 
et
32 . 0 39 . 0 93 . 0 1
) 43 . 0 52 . 0 (
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It is evident from the Equation 8 that 83 percent of the change in 6-month treasury 
bill rate is passed on to the 6-month KIBOR during the first month. Slight overshooting is 
observed in the following months, which is corrected later on. 
We employ similar procedure to estimate the pass through for the weighted average six 
month deposit rate and weighted average lending rate. The final equations for the two are 
indicated and discussed below.
2   
4.2.  Pass-through from Treasury Bill Rate to Lending Rate 
The pass of the 6-month Treasury bill rate to the weighted average lending rate has 
been estimated for the period June 1991 to June 2008. The data frequency is bi-annual. 
The transfer function developed for the weighted average rate of return on loans using 
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…  …  (9) 
The equation shows that  a total of 43 percent the change in six Treasury bill rate is 
passed is passed on to the lending rate (16 percent with a lag of two   periods and 27 
percent with a lag of three periods, each period being of six months) with a lag of one to 
one and a half year. The total pass-through to the lending rate being only 43 percent we 
can say that the lending rate exhibit rigidity.  
2Detailed results for weighted average six months deposit rate and weighted average lending rate are 
available from the authors upon request. 
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4.3.  Pass-through from Treasury Bill Rate to Six-month Deposit Rate 
The pass through of changes in 6-month Treasury bill rate to the 6-month weighted 
average deposit rate has been estimated for the Period June 1991 to June 2008. The 
frequency used  is bi-annual. The transfer  function  developed  for  six-month  weighted 
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The  transfer  function  described  above  shows  that  that  only  16  percent  of  the 
change in treasury bill rate is passed on to the weighted average rate of deposits and that 
too with a lag of two periods, that is, after one year.  
4.4.  Reasons for Slow and Asymmetric Pass Through 
While the pass through for the lending rate is 43 percent the pass through for the 
deposit rate is only 16 percent. This implies that banks are slow to change deposit rates 
relative to lending rates. The question is who benefits from asymmetric in pass through 
between lending and deposit rates. The answer is; it depends whether the asymmetry 
occurs in an environment of increasing interest rate or when the interest rate are on the 
decline. If the policy rate is on the rise, greater pass through to the lending rate relative to 
deposit rate would increase the interest margin of the banks therefore the banks seek to 
benefit from asymmetry while the converse holds true when the interest rates are on the 
decline. The greater pass through observed for lending rate relative to deposit rate leads 
one to  suspect that,  by and large,  the asymmetry has occurred in  an environment of 
increasing  interest rates.  Our data span  covers a period of 17  years (June 1990-June 
2008). During this period there have three major episodes of change in interest Treasury 
bill rate (Table  4).  
Table 4 




Direction of Change 
in Treasury Bill rate 
Change 
(Basis points) 
June 90-June 98   8  Upward  641 
Dec 98 - Dec 03  5  Downward  1411 
June 04 - June 08  4  Upward  1232 
 
 
It is evident from Table 4 that out of the 17 years data span, the treasury bill rate 
has followed an upward course for a period of twelve years while the downward trend 
has been observed for only five years. Moreover the magnitude of increase has also been 
greater than the decline. This explains why the pass through to the lending rate is greater 
than pass through to deposit rate: because in an environment of increasing interest rates 
greater pass through to lending rate increases the interest income of the banks but the cost 
of  funds  does  not  increase  by  corresponding  magnitude.  Therefore  the  greater  pass 
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Pegging of the lending rate to KIBOR is another important reason that explains the 
relatively greater pass through to the lending rate. The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) has 
instructed all the banks to link their corporate lending rate to KIBOR. Moreover loans for 
commodity operations to government departments have also been linked with KIBOR of 
appropriate tenor since 2006. Loans against export refinance facility, the subsidised credit 
to exporters, have also been pegged to the Treasury bill rate. Pegging of lending rate to 
these reference rate quickens the pass through, because as soon as the reference rate 
(KIBOR or Treasury bill rate) the change in lending rate (for fresh loans) invariably 
fallows.    
One reason for the slow pass through observed for weighted average lending rate 
and 6 month deposit rate is that these rates are for outstanding loans and deposits, which 
includes loans extended and deposits mobilised at the rates prevailing before the change 
in treasury bill rate. It is note worthy here that the volume of loans extended and deposit 
mobilised at previous rates is understandably much higher than the fresh loans extended 
and deposits mobilised after the change in the treasury bill rate. 
This brings us to the question: What manner of quoting interest/return on loans and 
deposits would speed up the transmission mechanism of monetary policy? The answer is 
that the floating rate,
3 that is, the rate specified with reference to some other interest rate, 
for  example  KIBOR  will  facilitate  pass-through  of  interest  rate  from  policy  rate  to 
lending and deposit rates. We have observed that the pass through to the KIBOR is very 
fast,  therefore  if  all  lending  rates  of  banks  are  quoted  in  terms  of  KIBOR  plus  and 
deposits rates are quoted as KIBOR minus then the lending and deposit rates will change 
as soon as the KIBOR changes.   
4.5.  Slow Pass through to Deposit Rate 
One reason for the slow pass-through to the deposit rate could be that behaviour of 
the depositors is not sufficiently interest sensitive. This is evident from the overtime 
composition of the total deposits, shown in Table 5. 
                                                                    
Table 5 
Trend in Composition of Deposits 
Type of Deposits 
 
Year 
(June)  Current  Savings  Non Fixed  Fixed 
T. Bill 
Rate 
1998  16  46  66  34  15.75 
1998  15  47  68  32  10.6 
2000  15  51  71  29  7.14 
2001  18  51  73  27  12.88 
2002  20  53  76  24  6.33 
2003  21  57  81  19  3.84 
2004  24  56  84  16  2.08 
2005  26  52  81  19  7.92 
2006  26  47  76  24  8.45 
2008  25  43  70  30  9.02 
 
3Floating  rate  implies  that  rate  for  the  entire  term  is  not  quoted  when  the  loans  or  deposits  are 
contracted, rather the rate changes (after a specified interval) with the change in reference rate to which the 
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If the depositors are not too sensitive to interest rate changes then one may expect 
that the banks can get away with incomplete pass through and delayed pass through. It is 
evident from table that majority of the deposits are held either in current account or 
savings account. The current account earns no interest while very little interest is paid to 
the holders of savings account. Given the failure of the banks to raise the rate on their 
own the SBP mandated only about a year ago to pay a minimum of 5 percent interest on 
savings account. This speaks volumes about the gravity of the situation regarding the low 
pass through to the deposit rate. It is clear from the composition of the deposits shown in 
Table 5 that the behaviour of the depositors holding a sizable deposit volume is not 
interest sensitive. Given the less sensitivity of the depositors to interest rate changes the 
banks in Pakistan have been able to get away with incomplete pass through, and delayed 
pass through on deposit rates. Hence the slow pass through to deposit rates. To quicken 
the pass through to deposit rates it is important that like the lending rate the deposit may 
also be linked KIBOR. However to implement such a regime effectively requires greater 
ability on the part of potential borrowers and depositors to forecast interest rate changes 
and mental preparedness that change in policy rate at times may adversely influence the 
depositors or the borrowers.  
5.  MACROECONOMIC IMPLICATION OF LIMITED PASS-THROUGH  
Pass-through and Taylor Principle 
Incomplete  pass-through  has  macroeconomic  implications.  One  consequence  is 
that this alters the popular Taylor rule [Kwapil and Scharler (2006)]. The rule, in essence 
implies that to maintain equilibrium, for every one percentage point increase in inflation, 
the interest rate should rise by more than one percentage point. The rule also implies that 
if the nominal interest rate does not rise, as suggested by Taylor,  a rise in  expected 
inflation  causes  the  real  interest  rate  to  decline.  The  resultant  stimulus  to  aggregate 
demand  causes  the  inflation  to  rise  further  and  thus  initial  expectations  are  fulfilled. 
Kwapil and Scharler contend that that an economy subject this type of shock will be 
highly unstable. To understand how the incomplete pass-through alters the Taylor rule let 
us very briefly examine the Taylor rule. The rule can be written as: 
) ( ) (
* * *
t t y t t t t t y y a a r i
 
Where it  is the targeted short term interest rate, pt  and 
*
t are the actual and targeted 
inflation  rate  respectively,
*
t r is  the  assumed  equilibrium interest  rate ) (
*
t t y y is  the 
output gap. To satisfy Taylor rule ap > 0. If this does not hold the real interest rate would 
decline with the change in policy rate. Kwapil and Scharler (2006) argue that limited 
pass-through alters the Taylor rule—because even if the nominal interest rate rises by 1 
percentage point, still in the face of incomplete pass through, the pass-through to market 
rates rate will be less than 1 percentage point. The Taylor rule, according to Kawpil and 
Scharler (2006) under an environment of incomplete pass-through, will be satisfied if  ap 
 
> 0, where 
 
is the long-run pass-through  to retail rates. Kwapil and Scharler (2006) 
citing various studies suggests that since the value ap   is sufficiently greater than one (in 
the rage 1.8-2.15) for US and euro area therefore even in the face of incomplete pass Pass-through of Change in Policy  673
through  the  monetary  policy  rules  will  most  probably  satisfy  the  conditions  for 
determinate equilibrium in US and euro area. For Pakistan only one study [Malik and 
Ahmad (2007)] has estimated the Taylor rule. The value of ap according to this study is 
0.51. If we take the pass through to the lending rate as 0.43, as worked out in this study, 
then  the  value  of  ap 
 
comes  to  only  0.22.  Clearly  Pakistan’s  economy  is  far  from 
satisfying  the  modified  Taylor  rule.  Irrespective  of  the  fact  that  whether  the  SBP  is 
following the Taylor principle for monetary management, the low value ap coupled with 
limited  pass-through  has  made  the  monetary  management  more  difficult  for  the 
authorities.   
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
We have estimated the pass through from six month treasury bill rate to different 
market rates including KIBOR, six month deposit rate and weighted average lending rate. 
While the pass through of the 6-month Treasury bill rate to 6-month KIBOR is almost 
complete  and  immediate  the  pass  through  to  the  6-month  deposit  rate  and  weighted 
average lending rate takes from a year to year and a half. Moreover the pass through to 
lending rate is much greater than the one observed for the deposit rate. Less interest 
sensitive behaviour of the depositors has enabled the banks to get away with slow pass 
through to deposits. On the other hand pegging of the rate on corporate loans and rate on 
loans for  commodity  operation  to  KIBOR has increased  the pace of  pass  through  to 
lending  rate.  This  implies  pegging  can  enhance  the  pass  through,  and  therefore  the 
effectiveness of the interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission. Moreover if 
the deposit rates, like lending rates for certain types of loans, are also pegged to KIBOR 
the pass through to the deposit rate would also increase and the asymmetry issue will be 
taken care off. However such pegging requires greater ability of the bank’s customers to 
forecast interest rate changes and be prepared for the worst as well. Finally we also 
showed that less than one for one pass through to the lending rate makes it more difficult 
to apply even if one attempts to apply the Taylor rule in Pakistan.       
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